This is a reading list for the Oxford finals “Logic and Language” paper, oriented more around philosophical logic than my other reading list for this paper. Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty’s reading list available through WebLearn.
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
1. Reference and definite descriptions
- (*) Lycan, ch. 1–2
- (*) Russell, B. (1905). On Denoting. Mind, 14(56), 479–493 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248381
- (*) Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind, 59(235), 320–344 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251176
- (*) Donnellan, K. S. (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. The Philosophical Review, 75(3), 281–304 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183143
- Russell, B. (1957). Mr. Strawson on Referring. Mind, 66(263), 385–389 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251489
Essay question: What is Russell’s theory of definite descriptions? Set out and evaluate an objection to it.
2. Semantic presupposition
- (*) Lycan, W. G. (2008). Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. Psychology Press, pp. 163-166
- (*) Gamut, L. T. F. (1991). Logic, language, and meaning. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, vol. 1, section 5.5
- Parsons, J. (2013). Presupposition, disagreement, and predicates of taste. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113, 163–173 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00350.x/abstract
- Gamut, L. T. F. (1991). Logic, language, and meaning. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, vol. 1, section 6.9-6.10
- Grice, P. (1989). Logic and conversation. In Studies in the way of words (pp. 22–40). Harvard Univ Pr
- Davis, W. “Implicature”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/
- Priest, G. (2008). An introduction to non-classical logic : from if to is (2nd ed..). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 7
Essay question: Contrast Grice’s theory of conventional implicature with Strawson’s (and his followers’) theory of semantic presupposition. OR What is semantic presupposition? Is many-valued logic a suitable way of representing semantic presuppositions?
3. Paraconsistency and the liar paradox
- (*) Tarski, A. (1944). The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(3), 341–376 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2102968
- (*) Priest, G. (1979). The Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 219–241 http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227165
- () Beall and Glanzberg. “Liar Paradox”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/
- Soames, S. (1999). Understanding truth. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195123352.001.0001/acprof-9780195123357, ch 5.
- Priest. “Dialetheism”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
- Glanzberg, M. (2001). The Liar in Context. Philosophical Studies, 103(3), 217–251 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A%3A1010314719817
Essay question: TBA
4. Modal logic and possible worlds semantics
- (*) Loux, M. J. (Ed.) (1979). The Possible and the actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality. Cornell Univ Pr, ch. 1
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1-20
- Garson, J. “Modal logic”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
Essay question: Which, if any, is the correct logic of metaphysical modality? (e.g. T? S4? S5?)
5. Modal realism and its rivals
- (*) Stalnaker, R. C. (1976). Possible Worlds. Noûs, 10(1), 65–75 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214477
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, ch. 3
Forrest’s defence of pictoral? / magical? ersatzism:
- Forrest, P. (1986a). Ways worlds could be. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1), 15–24
- Lewis, D. (1986). Against structural universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1), 25–46
- Forrest, P. (1986b). Neither magic nor mereology: A reply to Lewis
Inwagen’s defence of magical? ersatzism:
Essay question: Must an actualist theory of possible worlds involve primitive modality?
6. On trans-world identity and counterpart theory
- () Chisholm, R. M. (1967). Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions. Noûs, 1(1), 1–8 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214708 (also found in Loux, ibid*)
- (*) Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 42-46
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 192-209
- Sider, T. (2006). Beyond the Humphrey Objection http://tedsider.org/papers/counterpart_theory.pdf
- Lewis, D. K. (1968). Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy, 65(5), 113–126 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555
Essay question: Do individuals exist in more than one possible world?
7. Identity across times and worlds
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell pp. 202-205
- (*) Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001/acprof-9780199244430 ch. 1 and 4
- (*) Parsons, J. (2000). Must a four-dimensionalist believe in temporal parts? The Monist, 83(3), 399–418
- (*) Haslanger, S. (2003). Persistence through time. In M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press http://tinyurl.com/c2eubkc
- van Inwagen, P. (1990). Four-Dimensional Objects. Noûs, 24(2), 245–255 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215526
- Heller, M. (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge University Press ch. 1
- The rest of Sider’s book
Essay question: Do object persist through time by perduring or enduring?
8. TBA
Updated: 16 Sep 2016 20:08
