This is a reading list for a series of 4 tutorials on the topic of “non-cognitivism”.
- (*) Smith, M. A. (1994). The Moral Problem. Wiley-Blackwell, chs. 1-2
- (*) Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, chs. 1,3
- Ayer, A. J. (. J. (1946). Language, truth and logic (2nd ed. revised and reset..). London: Gollancz, ch. 6
- Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, chs. 4-5
- Hare, R. M. (1952). The language of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch. 1
- Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the word : groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch 6
- Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings : a theory of normative judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Schroeder, M. (2009). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge
Essay question: What is non-cognitivism in meta-ethics, and what do you think is the leading objection to it? Is your chosen objection decisive?
2. The Frege-Geach problem and its fallout
- (*) Geach, P. T. (1965). Assertion. The Philosophical Review, 74(4), 449–465 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183123
- (*) Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, chs. 4-5
- (*) Schroeder, M. (2010). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford Univ Pr, chs. 3-4
- Unwin, N. (2001). Norms and negation: A problem for Gibbard’s logic. The Philosophical Quarterly, 51(202), 60–75
- Unwin, N. (1999). Quasi‐Realism, Negation and the Frege‐Geach Problem. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(196), 337–352
- The citations to Blackburn and Gibbard above
Essay question: “Meta-ethical non-cognitivism is hopeless, as there is decisive linguistic evidence that we treat moral statements just as if they were truth-apt.” Discuss.
3. Cognitivism and non-assertoric speech acts
- (*) Austin, J. L. (1978). How to do things with words : the William James lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 (2nd ed..). Oxford: Oxford University Press lecture 1
- (*) Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 339–359 http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227173
- (*) Parsons, J. (2012). Cognitivism About Imperatives. Analysis, 72(1), 49–54 http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/72/1/49
- Bach, K. (1975). Performatives are statements too. Philosophical Studies, 28(4), 229–236 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00353970
- Charlow, N. (2014). The Meaning of Imperatives. Philosophy Compass, 9(8), 540–555 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12151/abstract
- Parsons, J. (2013). Command and consequence. Philosophical Studies, 164(1), 61–92 /papers/imperassertion7/
Essay question: Are imperatives truth-apt?
4. Blackburn’s supervenience argument
- (*) Blackburn, S. W. (1984). Supervenience Revisited. In I. Hacking (Ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy (pp. 59–74). Cambridge University Press (also reprinted in Sayre-McCord, G. (Ed.) (1988). Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press)
- (*) Dreier, J. (1992). The supervenience argument against moral realism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30(3), 13–38
- Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, s. 4.2(b) (and citations to Blackburn therein)
- Jackson, F. (2000). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press on Demand, ch. 5
Essay question: Does the supervenience of the moral on the natural help decide the debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in meta-ethics?
Updated: 05 Mar 2015 01:01
