This is a cut-down version of my full 8 tutorial reading list for the Oxford “Logic and Language” finals paper. Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty’s reading list available through WebLearn.
Useful texts / anthologies:
- Lycan: Lycan, W. G. (2008). Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. Psychology Press
- Ludlow: Ludlow, P. (Ed.) (1997). Readings in the Philosophy of Language. The MIT Press
- Schwartz: Schwartz, S. P. (1977). Naming, necessity, and natural kinds. Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press
I particularly recommend the textbook Philosophy of Language by Bill Lycan (Lycan), and have suggested readings from it in many cases. I would also encourage you to read the items Lycan suggests in his bibliography.
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
1. Reference and definite descriptions
- (*) Lycan, ch. 1–2
- (*) Russell, B. (1905). On Denoting. Mind, 14(56), 479–493 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248381
- (*) Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind, 59(235), 320–344 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251176
- (*) Donnellan, K. S. (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. The Philosophical Review, 75(3), 281–304 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183143
- Russell, B. (1957). Mr. Strawson on Referring. Mind, 66(263), 385–389 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251489
- Frege, G. (1948). Sense and Reference. (M. Black, Trans.)The Philosophical Review, 57(3), 209–230 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181485 (reprinted in Frege, G. (1980). Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege (3rd ed..). Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
- Donnellan, K. S. (1974). Speaking of Nothing. The Philosophical Review, 83(1), 3–31 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183871
- Searle, J. R. (1958). Proper Names. Mind, 67(266), 166–173 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108
Essay question: What is Russell’s theory of definite descriptions? Set out and evaluate an objection to it. OR Does every name have the same meaning as some definite description?
(Note that the title of Frege’s paper “Sense and Reference” is translated in a number of different ways, sometimes as “Sense and Meaning” or “Sense and Nominatum”).
2. Rigid designation and the Causal Theory of Reference
- (*) Lycan, ch. 3–4
- (*) Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, lecture 2
- (*) Evans, G. (1973). The Causal Theory of Names. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 47, 187–208 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106912
- (*) Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and Reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19), 699–711 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025079
Essay question: Does the “Twin Earth” case show that meaning “ain’t in the head”? OR What is the causal theory of reference? Assess an objection to it.
3. Sentence meaning
- (*) Lycan, ch. 7-10
- (*) Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. The Philosophical Review, 66(3), 377–388 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2182440 (reprinted in Grice, P. (1989a). Studies in the way of words. Harvard Univ Pr)
- (*) Grice, H. P. (1968). Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning. Foundations of Language, 4(3), 225–242 http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000329 (reprinted in Grice, P. (1989a). Studies in the way of words. Harvard Univ Pr)
- Lewis, D. (1970). General Semantics. Synthese, 22(1/2), 18–67 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20114749 (reprinted in Lewis, D. K. (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press, USA, volume 1)
Essay question: How does Grice propose to reduce sentence-meaning to speaker-meaning? Does he succeed? OR Is it plausible that the meaning of a sentence is the circumstances under which it is true?
4. Implicature (and conditionals)
- (*) Lycan, ch. 13
- (*) Grice, P. (1989b). Logic and conversation. In Studies in the way of words (pp. 22–40). Harvard Univ Pr
- (*) Bach, K. (1999). The Myth of Conventional Implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy, 22(4), 327–366 http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001747
- Jonathan Francis Bennett (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University Press, USA, esp ch 2
- Davis, W. “Implicature”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/
Essay question: What is implicature, and what is the difference between conversational and conventional implicatures? OR “A conditional is true iff either its antecedent is false or its consequent true.” Does conversational implicature help this theory to resist objections?
Updated: 05 Jan 2013 00:12
