This is a reading list for the Oxford finals “Logic and Language” paper. Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty’s reading list available through WebLearn.
Useful texts / anthologies:
- Lycan: Lycan, W. G. (2008). Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. Psychology Press
- Ludlow: Ludlow, P. (Ed.) (1997). Readings in the Philosophy of Language. The MIT Press
- Schwartz: Schwartz, S. P. (1977). Naming, necessity, and natural kinds. Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press
I particularly recommend the textbook Philosophy of Language by Bill Lycan (Lycan), and have suggested readings from it in many cases. I would also encourage you to read the items Lycan suggests in his bibliography.
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
1. Reference and definite descriptions
- (*) Lycan, ch. 1–2
- (*) Russell, B. (1905). On Denoting. Mind, 14(56), 479–493 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248381
- (*) Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind, 59(235), 320–344 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251176
- (*) Donnellan, K. S. (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. The Philosophical Review, 75(3), 281–304 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183143
- Russell, B. (1957). Mr. Strawson on Referring. Mind, 66(263), 385–389 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251489
Essay question: What is Russell’s theory of definite descriptions? Set out and evaluate an objection to it.
2. The description theory of proper names
- (*) Lycan, ch. 3
- (*) Frege, G. (1948). Sense and Reference. (M. Black, Trans.)The Philosophical Review, 57(3), 209–230 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181485 (reprinted in Frege, G. (1980). Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege (3rd ed..). Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
- Donnellan, K. S. (1974). Speaking of Nothing. The Philosophical Review, 83(1), 3–31 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183871
- Searle, J. R. (1958). Proper Names. Mind, 67(266), 166–173 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108
(Note that the title of Frege’s paper “Sense and Reference” is translated in a number of different ways, sometimes as “Sense and Meaning” or “Sense and Nominatum”).
Essay question: Does every name have the same meaning as some definite description?
3. Rigid designation and the Causal Theory of Reference
- (*) Lycan, ch. 4
- (*) Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, lecture 2
- (*) Evans, G. (1973). The Causal Theory of Names. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 47, 187–208 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106912
- (*) Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and Reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19), 699–711 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025079
Essay question: Does the “Twin Earth” case show that meaning “ain’t in the head”? OR What is the causal theory of reference? Assess an objection to it.
4. Presupposition and bivalence
- Remind yourself of Strawson, P. F. (1950). On Referring. Mind, 59(235), 320–344 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251176
- (*) Lycan, ch. 13
- (*) van Fraassen, B. C. (1968). Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 65(5), 136–152 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024557
- (*) Stalnaker, R. (1999). Pragmatic presuppositions. In Context and content: essays on intentionality in speech and thought (pp. 47–62). Oxford University Press, USA
- Gamut, L. T. F. (1991). Logic, language, and meaning. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, volume 1, section 5.5
- Karttunen, L. (1973). Presuppositions of Compound Sentences. Linguistic Inquiry, 4(2), 169–193 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177763
- Parsons, J. (2013). Presupposition, disagreement, and predicates of taste. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113, 163–173 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00350.x/abstract
Essay question: Are there cases of “failed presupposition” in which a meaningful sentence lacks a truth-value?
5. The Liar paradox
- (*) Tarski, A. (1944). The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4(3), 341–376 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2102968
- (*) Soames, S. (1999). Understanding truth. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195123352.001.0001/acprof-9780195123357, ch 5.
- (*) Kripke, S. (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 72(19), 690–716 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024634
- (*) Priest. “Dialetheism”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
- Priest, G. (1979). The Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 219–241 http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227165
- Glanzberg, M. (2001). The Liar in Context. Philosophical Studies, 103(3), 217–251 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A%3A1010314719817
- Beall and Glanzberg. “Liar Paradox”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/
Essay question: What is the Liar paradox, and what is the best way to resolve it?
6. Opaque contexts and belief attributions
- (*) Frege, G. (1948). Sense and Reference. (M. Black, Trans.)The Philosophical Review, 57(3), 209–230 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181485 (reprinted in Frege, G. (1980). Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege (3rd ed..). Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
- (*) Quine, W. V. (1956). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 53(5), 177–187 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2022451
- (*) Quine, W. V. O. (1964). Word and Object. MIT Press, pp. 138-156 (reprinted in Ludlow)
- Davidson, D. (1968). On Saying That. Synthese, 19(1/2), 130–146 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20114635 (reprinted in Ludlow)
- Kripke, S. A. (1979). A Puzzle about Belief. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy (Vol. 3, pp. 239–283). Springer Netherlands http://www.springerlink.com/content/p3522rg026m811v5/abstract/ (reprinted in Ludlow)
- Saul, J. M. (2010). Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions. Oxford University Press
- http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/
Essay question: Does the existence of opaque contexts show that there must be more to the meaning of a name than its referent?
7. Modality and modal logic
- (*) Loux, M. J. (Ed.) (1979). The Possible and the actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality. Cornell Univ Pr introduction
- (*) Lewis, D. K. (1968). Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. The Journal of Philosophy, 65(5), 113–126 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024555
- (*) Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 44-47 (this is a very short reading but it’s significant - start at the first full paragraph on p. 44, and don’t skip the giant footnote on p. 45)
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 194-210
- Rest of Loux, M. J. (Ed.) (1979). The Possible and the actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality. Cornell Univ Pr
- Rest of Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell
- Garson. “Modal logic”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
Essay question: How are the truth conditions of “Barack Obama might have been a composer” best understood?
8. Indexicals
- (*) Frege, G. (1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. (A. Quinton & M. Quinton, Trans.)Mind, 65(259), 289–311 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251513
- (*) Perry, J. (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. The Philosophical Review, 86(4), 474–497 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184564
- (*) Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, D. Kaplan, J. Perry, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lewis, D. K. (. K. (1998). Index, context, and content. In Papers in philosophical logic (pp. 21–44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Braun, D. “Indexicals”. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/
Essay question: On Tuesday, A says “Today is Tuesday”; the next day, A says “Yesterday was Tuesday”. In what sense, if any, do A’s two utterances have the same meaning, and in what sense, if any, do they have a different meaning?
Updated: 21 Nov 2012 00:12
