This is a reading list for the Oxford philosophy finals paper “Knowledge and Reality”. Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty’s reading list available through WebLearn.
Note that this reading list particularly concentrates on metaphysics, rather than epistemology.
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
Useful texts and anthologies:
- Kim&Sosa: Jaegwon Kim, & Ernest Sosa (1999). Metaphysics: An Anthology. Blackwell Publishing
- B&D: Bernecker, S., & Dretske, F. I. (2000). Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Effingham, N. (2013). An Introduction to Ontology. Polity
- Laurence, S., & Macdonald, C. (1998). Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Wiley-Blackwell
- van Inwagen, P., & Zimmerman, D. W. (Eds.) (1998). Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Wiley-Blackwell
- Loux, M. J. (2002). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. Psychology Press
1. The problem of change
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 202-204
- (*) Haslanger, S. (2003). Persistence through time. In M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press http://tinyurl.com/c2eubkc
- (*) Zimmerman, D. W. (1998). Temporary intrinsics and presentism. In P. van Inwagen (Ed.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions (pp. 206–219). Wiley-Blackwell http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/TempIntrinsicsPostscript.pdf
- (*) Parsons, J. (2000). Must a four-dimensionalist believe in temporal parts? The Monist, 83(3), 399–418
- Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001/acprof-9780199244430, pp 1-10, 92-97
Essay question: What is the “problem of temporary intrinsics”? What is the best way of solving it.
2. Other issues about identity over time
- (*) Heller, M. (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge University Press, ch 1 (reprinted as ch. 25 of Kim&Sosa)
- (*) Thomson, J. J. (1983). Parthood and Identity Across Time. The Journal of Philosophy, 80(4), 201–220 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026004 (reprinted in Kim&Sosa)
- (*) van Inwagen, P. (2001). The doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts. In Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (pp. 75–94). Cambridge University Press
- van Inwagen, P. (1990). Four-Dimensional Objects. Noûs, 24(2), 245–255 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215526
- Parsons, J. (2007). Theories of location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 3, 201–232 http://otago.academia.edu/JoshParsons/Papers/1015465/Theories_of_Location
- Rest of Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001/acprof-9780199244430
Essay question: Do objects persist through time by having temporal parts?
3. Time and tense
- L&M: Le Poidevin, R., & MacBeath, M. (Eds.) (1993). The Philosophy of time. Oxford University Press, USA
- (*) McTaggart, J. M. E. (1921). The nature of existence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 33 (reprinted as L&M, ch 1)
- (*) Mellor, D. H. (1981). Real time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 6 (reprinted as L&M, ch 3)
- (*) Le Poidevin, R. (Ed.) (2002). Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford Univ Pr on Demand, ch 1
- Mellor, D. H. (1981). Real time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Le Poidevin, R. (Ed.) (2002). Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford Univ Pr on Demand
Essay question: What is McTaggart’s paradox? What, if anything, does it show about the nature of time?
4. Induction
- (*) Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy. London: Thornton Butterworth, ch 6 (reprinted in B&D)
- (*) B&D, ch 38 (the selection from Reichenbach)
- (*) Cleve, J. V. (1984). Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 9(1), 555–567 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00077.x/abstract
- (*) Goodman, N. (1983). Fact, fiction, and forecast (4th ed. / new foreward by Hilary Putnam..). Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, pp. 72-83 (reprinted in B&D)
- Stanford encyclopedia on the Problem of Induction
Essay question: Is inductive inference an epistemically acceptable way of forming beliefs?
5. Universals
- (*) Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy. London: Thornton Butterworth, ch 9 “A world of universals”
- (*) Armstrong, David Malet (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Pr
- (*) Lewis, D. (1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4), 343–377 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048408312341131
- Mellor, D. H., & Oliver, A. (1997). Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, especially the introduction
- Armstrong, David Malet (1978a). Universals and scientific realism: Nominalism and Realism (Vols. 1-2, Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Armstrong, David Malet (1978b). Universals and scientific realism: A theory of universals (Vols. 1-2, Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Essay question: Is there a good reason to believe in universals (e.g. redness) over and above particulars (e.g. particular red things)?
6. Ontological commitment / Truthmakers
- (*) Quine, W. V. O. (1961). On what there is. In From a logical point of view: 9 logico-philosophical essays. Harvard Univ Pr (reprinted in Kim&Sosa)
- (*) Armstrong, D. M. (1980). Against Ostrich Nominalism: a Reply to Michael Devitt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (reprinted in Mellor, D. H., & Oliver, A. (1997). Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- (*) Devitt, M. (1980). Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61, 433–449 (reprinted in Devitt, M. (2009). Putting Metaphysics First. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001/acprof-9780199280803-chapter-2)
- Van Cleve, J. (1994). Predication without universals? A fling with ostrich nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 577–590
- Parsons, J. (1999). There is no “truthmaker” argument against nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77(3), 325–334 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409912349081
- Cameron, R. P. (2008). Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble. Philosophical Studies, 140(1), 1–18 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-008-9223-3
Essay question: What is Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment? What is its relevance to the debate over realism about universals?
7. Modality
- Loux: Loux, M. J. (Ed.) (1979). The Possible and the actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality. Cornell Univ Pr
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell chapter 1
- (*) Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ch 4, sect 1 “Possible Worlds” (reprinted in Loux)
- (*) Stalnaker, R. C. (1976). Possible Worlds. Noûs, 10(1), 65–75 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214477 (reprinted in Loux)
- (*) Lycan, W. (1979). The Trouble with Possible Worlds. In M. J. Loux (Ed.), The Possible and the actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality (pp. 274–316). Cornell Univ Pr
- Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell chapter 2-3
Essay question: What is a possible world, and what reasons might there be for us to believe in possible worlds other than the actual one?
8. Identity over possible worlds
- (*) Chisholm, R. M. (1967). Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions. Noûs, 1(1), 1–8 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214708
- (*) Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp. 44-47 (this is a very short reading but it’s significant - start at the first full paragraph on p. 44, and don’t skip the giant footnote on p. 45)
- (*) Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 194-210
- Lewis, D. (2001). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell chapter 4
Essay question: Can one and the same thing exist in two possible worlds? OR Set out and assess Kripke’s “Humphrey Objection” to counterpart theory.
Updated: 24 Feb 2015 01:01
