This is a reading list for the Oxford philosophy finals paper “Ethics”. Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty’s reading list available through WebLearn.
Part A: Ethical Theories
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
Useful anthologies:
1. Consequentialism vs deontology
- Scheffler: Scheffler, S. (1988). Consequentialism and its critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- (*) Pettit, P. (1993). Consequentialism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics (pp. 230–240). Wiley-Blackwell
- (*) McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (2005). Deontology. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797
- Ross, W. D. (. D. (2002). The right and the good ([New ed.].). Oxford: Clarendon Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252653.001.0001/acprof-9780199252657, ch 2
- Brown, C. (2011). Consequentialize This. Ethics, 121(4), 749–771 http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/660696
- Broome, J. (1991). Weighing goods : equality, uncertainty and time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ch 1
- Scheffler, S. (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235119.001.0001/acprof-9780198235118, esp ch 2
- Foot, P. (1985). Utilitarianism and the Virtues. Mind, 94(374), 196–209 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254745
- Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 26-33 (reprinted in Scheffler)
- Railton, P. (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13(2), 134–171 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265273 (reprinted in Scheffler)
Essay question: Are there any ethical intuitions that cannot be accomodated within some, suitably complex, consequentialist ethical theory? OR State and assess an argument for consequentialism.
2. Deontological ethics and the trolley problem
- (*) Foot, P. (2002a). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. In Virtues and Vices. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252866.001.0001/acprof-9780199252862
- (*) Thomson, J. J. (1986). Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. In Rights, restitution, and risk : essays in moral theory. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Harvard University Press
- (*) Thomson, J. J. (2008). Turning the Trolley. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36(4), 359–374 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00144.x/abstract
- Kagan, S. (1991). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198239165.001.0001/acprof-9780198239161, ch 1-4
Essay question: Is there a morally relevant difference between doing and allowing harm? What bearing does the trolley problem have on this? OR What is the doctrine of double effect? Is it a correct moral principle?
3. Kantianism
- (*) Kant, I. (1948). Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. (H. J. (. J. Paton, Trans.). London: Hutchinson
- (*) Feldman, F. (1978). Introductory ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, ch 7-9
- (*) Hill, T. (2005). Kantian normative ethics. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797
- Korsgaard, C. M. (. M. (1996). Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- O’Neill, O. (1989). Constructions of reason : explorations of Kant’s practical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Hill, T. E. (1991). Autonomy and self-respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Mackie, J. L. (. L. (1977). Ethics : inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, ch 4, pp. 151-154, 242-243
Essay question: What is the Categorical Imperative? Is it a plausible ethical principle?
4. Virtue Ethics
- (*) Crisp, R. (1998). Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues. In R. Crisp (Ed.), How Should One Live? Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198752342.001.0001/acprof-9780198752349
- (*) Hursthouse, R. (1998). Normative Virtue Ethics. In R. Crisp (Ed.), How Should One Live? Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198752342.001.0001/acprof-9780198752349
- (*) Hurka, T. (2001). Virtue, Vice, and Value. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195137167.001.0001/acprof-9780195137163, ch 8.
- Foot, P. (2002b). Virtues and Vices. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252866.001.0001/acprof-9780199252862
- Harman, G. (1999). Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545312
- Mackie, J. L. (. L. (1977). Ethics : inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 186-189
- Crisp, R., & Slote, M. A. (1997). Virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Das, R. (2003). Virtue Ethics and Right Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(3), 324–339 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713659702
Essay question: How, if at all, does virtue ethics differ from consequentialism and deontology? Is it a tenable alternative form of ethical theory?
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
Useful texts/anthologies:
5. Naturalism, non-naturalism, ought and is
- (*) Moore, G. E. (. E. (1903). Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 3
- (*) Pigden, C. R. (1993). Naturalism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics (pp. 230–240). Wiley-Blackwell
- (*) Michael Ridge, “Moral non-naturalism” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/
- Prior, A. N. (. N. ) (1949). Logic and the basis of ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch 1
- Searle, J. R. (1964). How to Derive “Ought” From “Is”. The Philosophical Review, 73(1), 43–58 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183201
Essay question: Set out and evaluate Moore’s “Open Question” argument for non-naturalism. OR Is it possible to derive an “ought” from an “is”?
6. Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism
- (*) Smith, M. A. (1994). The Moral Problem. Wiley-Blackwell, chs. 1-2
- (*) Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, chs. 1,3
- Ayer, A. J. (. J. (1946). Language, truth and logic (2nd ed. revised and reset..). London: Gollancz, ch. 6
- Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, chs. 4-5
- Hare, R. M. (1952). The language of morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch. 1
- Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the word : groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch 6
- Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings : a theory of normative judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Schroeder, M. (2009). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge
Essay question: What is non-cognitivism in meta-ethics, and what do you think is the leading objection to it? Is your chosen objection decisive?
7. Realism vs. non-realism
- (*) Dreier, J. (2005). Moral relativism and moral nihilism. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797
- (*) Mackie, J. L. (. L. (1977). Ethics : inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, ch 1
- (*) Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral realism: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/
- Sayre-McCord, G. (2005). Moral realism. In D. Copp (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195147790.001.0001/acprof-9780195147797
- Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, ch 6, 8, 9
Essay question: Assess either Mackie’s argument from relativity, or his argument from queerness.
Part C. Other
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
8. Death and harm
- Fischer: Fischer, J. M. (1993). The Metaphysics of death. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press
- (*) Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus”, in Long, A. A., & Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, or at http://www.epicurus.net/en/menoeceus.html
- (*) Nagel, T. (1970). Death. Noûs, 4(1), 73–80 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214297 (reprinted in Fischer)
- (*) McMahan, J. (1988). Death and the Value of Life. Ethics, 99(1), 32–61 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380928 (reprinted in Fischer)
- Feldman, F. (1991). Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death. The Philosophical Review, 100(2), 205–227 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185300
- Bradley, B. (2004). When Is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Noûs, 38(1), 1–28 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00460.x/abstract
Essay question: In what sense, if any, is death harmful to the person who dies?
Updated: 20 Jan 2015 01:01
