Forthcoming in Analysis.
Abstract: Stage theory holds that the objects of ordinary discourse are instantaneous stages of four-dimensionally extended objects. This view contrasts with worm theory, according to which the objects of ordinary discourse are themselves four-dimensionally extended. This paper presents an argument that the way we experience time is more consistent with our being instantaneous objects than with our being temporally extended throughout our entire lifetimes. By argument to the best explanation therefore, experiencing subjects – persons – are stages; since persons are among the objects of ordinary discourse, worm theory is false.
Updated 9 May 2013: thanks for some pointers from Brad Skow.
Parsons, Josh. 2015. “A Phenomenological Argument for Stage Theory.” Analysis 75 (2): 237–42. doi:10.1093/analys/anv022.
Until September 2016 I am a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at Corpus Christi College and an Associate Professor in the Oxford Philosophy Faculty. From then on, I'll be a Senior Adviser at the New Zealand Ministry of Transport.
My intellectual interests are mainly in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and ethics, and of course transport policy.
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